In November 1869 one of the greatest feats of human engineering was completed. The 102 mile long Suez Canal cut through Egypt and connected the Mediterranean with the Red Sea. This waterway irrevocably changed the world as it massively reduced the trade routes between Europe and Asia, removing the need for ships to circle Africa and traverse the Cape of Good Hope. In 2012 more than 17,000 ships passed through the Suez Canal. In 1956, however, this waterway took on even greater significance as it became a key battle ground between the post-colonial world and the waning imperial powers.
In 1952 the Egyptian monarchy was overthrown in a military coup. Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser was one of the key figures in this seizure of power and began to institute a series of progressive reforms during his time as Minister for the Interior and later Deputy Prime Minister of Egypt. In 1954 the future of Egypt took another drastic change in direction as Nasser assumed command of the government and military.
After securing his position Nasser began to institute ever greater reforms of Egypt; promoting pan-Arabism, becoming less reliant on Europe, and pursuing a neutral stance in the Cold War. These polices alienated Britain and France who had maintained close ties to Egypt during and after the two World Wars and were becoming increasingly worried by the rise of Arab nationalism. In 1956 the increasing tension came to a head when Britain and the United States removed their backing for the planned Aswan Dam.
'Between Kantara and El-Fedane. The first vessels through the Canal' an engraving in 'Appleton's Journal of Popular Literature, Science, and Art', 1869
Following the 1952 revolution Egypt’s government had hoped to harness and control the life giving waters of the Nile. The proposed dam would generate massive amounts of energy for Egypt while stabilising the river’s annual flooding. Britain and the US had offered funding and support for this project with the aim of bringing Nasser and Egypt onside in the Cold War and, by extension, promoting anti-communism in the Middle East. Nasser continued to pursue a position of neutrality, however, and built up increasingly close ties to the Soviet Union in 1955 and ’56.
These growing ties to the USSR and Egypt’s decision to recognise the People’s Republic of China saw Britain and the US withdraw their funding for the Aswan Dam. In response Nasser nationalised the Suez Canal on the 26th of July, offering recompense to the company’s former shareholders and closing the passageway to Israeli shipping. This move was wholly unexpected and, as public opinion at home rose against Egypt, the governments of Britain, France, and Israel began to plan for retaliatory action.
The rest of the world was, however, less interested in Egypt’s seizure of the Suez Canal and more interested in the precarious balance of the Cold War. Of all the members of the Commonwealth only Australia and New Zeeland offered any support to the British grievance. Most other members refused to be drawn into the conflict and advocated a policy of non-aggression, with some former British colonies even supporting Egypt’s actions. The worst blow to the French and British, however, came from the United States as they refused to support any aggressive actions by their NATO allies.
Turkish troops on their way to the Suez Canal in 1914
Instead the United States tried to bring the situation to a peaceful conclusion with talks and negotiations between the interested parties. By the end of September, however, no clear solution was forthcoming. While the other interested parties sought international oversight for and the guaranteed neutrality of the Suez Canal, Egypt refused any such move that might compromise its sovereignty. While these talks had been ongoing Britain, France, and Israel had been planning their invasion of Egypt and the possible overthrow of Nasser, which were put into action once it became clear diplomacy had failed.
The plan called for an Israeli invasion and seizure of the Sinai Peninsula. If all went to plan the Egyptian Army would be forced to retreat to Egypt proper, at which time the British and French would strike. With its army so decisively defeated, Egypt would have little choice but to acquiesce to international supervision of the Suez Canal. The British and French also planned to severely disrupt the Egyptian economy in hopes that, together with the military defeat, this would cause the people to revolt and overthrow Nasser.
While Britain and France were mainly concerned with securing their trade routes and reasserting their influence in North Africa and the Middle East, Israel had more immediate reasons to invade Egypt. Despite victory in the Arab-Israeli War and the 1949 Armistice Agreements Israel felt in a vulnerable position, which was exacerbated by the ongoing fedayeen activity and Nasser’s procurement of Soviet weapons. Should the invasion go as planned Israel’s southern boarders would be safer and stable access to the Red Sea secured.
British 3rd Battalion, Parachute Regiment, and Commandos at the Coast Guard barracks in Port Said, November 1956
On the 29th of October Operation Musketeer was launched as the Israeli Defence Force invaded the Sinai Peninsula en masse. The Egyptians were caught unawares and the IDF marched from victory to victory. As planned Britain and France sent an ultimatum to both Israel and Egypt demanding they withdraw from the Suez Canal. Nasser responded by closing the canal and sinking 40 ships found in its waters. On the 31st of October Britain and France joined the conflict by bombing Egypt and by the 5th of November there were boots on the ground.
Facing better troops with superior training and technology the Egyptian Army suffered a string of defeats and soon the British and French had firm holds in Egyptian territory. Nasser sought to cripple the British and French advance by declaring the conflict a ‘people’s war’. Guns were distributed to civilians while the Egyptian soldiers discarded their uniforms for civilian garb. With no clear targets to identify, the British and French faced being labelled butchers and losing support at home or else exposing themselves to ambush from within civilian crowds.
In the end, however, the conflict was a foregone conclusion. The international support that had existed for British and French grievances over the nationalisation of the Suez Canal quickly dissipated once war was engaged. Their justifications for action weren’t accepted and the British, French, and Israelis were blamed as the aggressors in the Suez Crisis. Even in Britain the invasion proved unpopular with numerous anti-war protests taking place around the country. In the end the British government kowtowed to these pressures and announced a ceasefire on the 6th of November, much to the dismay of her French and Israeli allies.
An Israeli soldier standing beside a captured Egyptian gun
Despite suffering successive military defeats Nasser had emerged victorious and by the end of April 1957 the Suez Canal was fully reopened to shipping under Egyptian control. Though public opinion had played its part in deciding the outcome of previous conflicts the Suez Crisis marked its rising importance. The growth of media and its availability made global goings on increasingly accessible to the public. As such a nation’s conduct on the world stage became ever more important to the people at home.
The rise of the United Nations and the onset of the Cold War saw international goings-on, and their possible consequences, become even more closely observed. With new and independent nations emerging from the ashes of the decaying empires the international balance of power was in flux. The invasion of Sinai and Egypt were viewed as damaging to the West’s campaign of painting the Soviet Union as an aggressive despotic state. In the end it was these combined factors that defeated the British, French, and Israeli forces in 1956.
Join Patrick as he looks back on the Suez Crisis with a panel of experts. Was Nasser’s rule really a threat to British and French interests? Why did Israel get involved in this conflict and what was the lasting result in the Middle East? What impact did this conflict have on the decolonisation of Africa and Asia? And why was an uprising in Hungary and the IMF so important to the outcome of the Suez Crisis in Egypt?
